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The Origins of quare impedit
JOSHUA C. TATE
The writ of quare impedit was, until the mid-nineteenth century, a
standard real action for the recovery of advowsons. This article
argues that the writ was most likely created between 1187 and
1196, and that it was, at least in part, a response to pressure from
religious houses that acquired advowsons by charter of gift and
were precluded from bringing the writ of right of advowson or the
assize of darrein presentment.
In Easter term 1198, during the ninth year of the reign of Richard I, the abbot
of Stanley appeared before the English royal justices to offer himself in a plea
of quare impedit presentationem against Matthew fitz Herbert, a baron and
prominent member of the royal court.' The abbot was suing Matthew on
behalf of his monastery over the right to present a parson to the church of
Stokenham, in Devon, claiming that this advowson, or right of presentation,
2
belonged to the monastery by gift from Matthew's mother-in-law, Mabel
Patric. Matthew did not appear that day, but the litigation continued, and
the parties were subsequently ordered to appear in court in Trinity term
barring an interim settlement.
3
While the litigation between Matthew and the monastery was pending,
Mabel - or, more likely, someone writing in Mabel's name - sent a passio-
nate letter to the royal justiciar, Geoffrey fitz Peter, confirming the monas-
tery's side of the story.4 The letter explained that, out of concern for her
soul and that of her father, Mabel gave the advowson of the church of Stoken-
ham in perpetuity to God and the monks of Stanley and confirmed the gift by a
charter. The person writing as Mabel emphasized that the gift was made before
Mabel's daughter was married or even betrothed. 'Prostrated at your feet',
concluded the supposed Mabel, 'I pray and seek with heart and soul that
you, as a true friend of God and his servants, for the love of God and the
salvation of your soul, establish a firm foundation for my gift and maintain
the abovementioned servants of God in their right.'
5
The affection for the monks and concern for her soul attributed to Mabel in
this letter did not, it seems, last long. As the lawsuit between the monastery
and Matthew progressed, the case spawned a separate plea between the
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monastery and Mabel, with the abbot seeking to have Mabel defend her
alleged gift in court. 6 Mabel claimed that she could not appear on account
of bed-sickness, and knights were sent to determine if Mabel wanted to
warrant her gift. 7 When the knights returned, they informed the court that,
according to Mabel, she made the gift to the abbey at the queen's request
8
and after Matthew had married her daughter, at which point the tenement to
which the advowson was appurtenant was no longer in her hand. For this
reason, the knights explained, Mabel did not wish to appear before the court
or attom anyone in her place.9 No judgment is recorded,' 0 and thus we do
not know how the justices reconciled Mabel's letter, in which she said that
the gift was made before her daughter's marriage, with the contradictory
report from the knights.
This case is interesting on a number of levels. First, the case is an example
of the importance of advowsons to the English nobility and religious houses.
Whether their interest was based on a need for additional income (in the case
of religious houses) or a desire to control a valuable source of patronage (in the
case of laymen), parties were willing to fight over advowsons in the royal
courts in lawsuits that could last for years. Second, the conflict between the
letter and the knights' testimony reminds us that a historian must be sceptical
in evaluating statements attributed to the parties to a lawsuit. If Mabel gave the
advowson to the abbey after her daughter's marriage, then the letter sent to the
justiciar does not speak the truth; if the letter correctly states the facts, then
either Mabel had a faulty memory, Mabel lied to the knights, or the knights
did not accurately report what Mabel said. Third, the case prompts questions
about the situation that produced this particular property dispute. If Mabel lost
her rights in the advowson when her daughter was married, as the knights
implied, why was this so? One suspects that a grant in maritagium was
involved, but the record of the case does not provide the details.' 1
While all these issues may deserve attention, the present article will focus
on a different point, which is not obvious from the face of the litigation. An
underlying assumption of the case is that, even though they have not presented
a candidate who was instituted as parson of the church, the monks have a cause
of action against Matthew: namely, the action of quare impedit.12 Had this
litigation commenced only ten years earlier, however, the monks may well
not have had such a remedy. The case between Matthew and the monks is
one of the earliest surviving examples of quare impedit, and this article will
argue that the new action was intended to cover this sort of case: a lawsuit
brought against a layman by a religious house claiming an advowson by
charter of gift.
It has long been recognized that the writ of quare impedit is quite early
in origin, and that it was designed to give the donee of an advowson
who had not yet presented a parson a remedy in the royal courts.' 3 Previous
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scholarship, however, has neither set a firm date for the creation of the writ nor
explained why a remedy for the donee was of special significance. This article
argues that the writ of quare impedit was created near the end of the twelfth
century, probably after 1187 and no later than 1196. Regarding the purpose
of the writ, this article asserts that it was probably created, at least in part,
in response to pressure from religious houses, which had been excluded
from the assize of darrein presentment and were also unable to bring the
writ of right.
Religious houses were not the only sort of plaintiffs that stood to benefit
from quare impedit, but they frequently received advowsons by gift, and
they had especial reason to lobby for a writ that catered specifically to
donees. Quare impedit was that writ. Once the writ was created, however, it
was popular among laymen as well, offering a third alternative to lay plaintiffs
who could not, or did not wish to, bring the writ of right or the assize. Quare
impedit quickly became a remedy of general application in disputes involving
advowsons, and it remained a part of the common law long after the religious
houses that originally benefited from it were dissolved.
ADVOWSON REMEDIES UNDER HENRY II
In the first clause of the Constitutions of Clarendon, promulgated in 1164,
Henry I1 proclaimed that controversies concerning advowsons and presen-
tation to churches, whether between laymen, between laymen and clerks, or
between clerks, were to be decided in the royal courts. 14 This sweeping state-
ment appears to have both summarized existing practice and set forth an
aspiration for the future. On the one hand, Clarendon was not the first mani-
festation of a royal desire to meddle in advowson disputes. For example,
writs survive from 1156 in which Henry ordered the bishop of Norwich to
restore certain advowsons to the abbot of St. Benet's Hulme.15 On the other
hand, ecclesiastical courts did not immediately lose their jurisdiction over
advowsons in 1164; disputes over presentation continued to be litigated in
ecclesiastical courts into the thirteenth century. 6 The conflict ofjurisdictions
was not completely resolved even by the time of Bracton, let alone the reign of
Henry 11.17
Because no plea rolls survive from the reign of Henry II, we cannot know
for certain what remedies were initially available. In the Chronicon of Battle
Abbey we hear of a case from the 1160s in which the abbey was prevented
from exercising its right of presentation by a knight named Hamo Peche;
the abbey commenced suit in both the royal and the ecclesiastical court, the
former based on 'the violence of the knight', the latter on 'the intrusion of
the clerk'.' 8 The reference to 'violence' suggests that the royal action might
have been delictual in nature, but the author does not seem to have been
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attuned to the fine distinctions of technical legal language. The sole writ that
can be said with certainty to have existed from early in Henry's reign is the
precipe writ of right.
The earliest examples of the precipe writ are directed at the bishop, order-
ing him to restore an advowson to an abbey, but they are writs for the enforce-
ment of a prior judgment, not for the initiation of litigation. It is not clear what
procedure was followed, although the writs refer to an 'oath of lawful men'. 
1 9
In another early case, the right to an advowson was decided by a special royal
inquest called for the purpose.20 By the end of Henry II's reign, however, the
defendant could choose between battle and the grand assize, as with the writ of
right of land.2 '
Whatever the procedure was for the writ of right in the late 11 70s, the Third
Lateran Council held in 1179 rendered it inadequate. 22 Canon 17 of this council
provided that, if putative patrons supported several candidates for institution to
a benefice, that clerk would be instituted who had the greater merit and who
was supported and chosen by the assent of the greater number. If such an
election could not be made 'without scandal', the bishop would decide the
matter as he thought best. Most importantly, if a dispute between the patrons
dragged on for more than three months, or six months in the case of a dispute
between ecclesiastical patrons, the bishop would automatically choose the
parson himself.
23
After the Third Lateran Council, the royal courts needed a procedure that
could quickly decide an advowson dispute before the passage of time triggered
Canon 17 and gave the bishop the prerogative to choose his preferred candi-
date. The writ of right, which was decided either by battle or by the cumber-
some procedure of electing four knights to choose twelve other knights for the
grand assize, according to the election of the defendant,2 and which turned on
the sometimes complex question of who had the greater right in the advowson,
was not such a remedy. This was probably the impetus for the creation of the
assize of darrein presentment, which first appears in the sources beginning in
1180.25
The assize of darrein presentment was one of several recognitions created
by Henry II and his advisers, and, like novel disseisin and mort d'ancestor,
was designed to offer an interim resolution to a property dispute based on
recent possession.26 The writ of darrein presentment summoned a jury
'ready to declare on oath which patron presented the last parson to
the church in [a particular] vill, which is alleged to be vacant and of which
[the plaintiff] claims the advowson'. 27 The defendant was allowed to raise
certain exceptions, such as that an ancestor of the plaintiff, after the last
28presentation, gave the advowson to the defendant. In such a case the
assize would not proceed, and the parties would join issue on the exception.29
However, a donee who had never presented could not successfully bring the
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assize as a plaintiff against the person who last presented or his heir, as the
jury would answer the question quis advocatus presentavit ultimam personam
in favour of the defendant and that would end the matter.
30
The creation of the assize of darrein presentment affected the availability
of the writ of right in cases where the plaintiff could not claim the last pres-
entation. Glanvill tells us that a plaintiff who brings the writ of right must
state whether or not he as his ancestor last presented. If the plaintiff
claimed the last presentation, or asserted that some third party last presented,
and the defendant claimed the last presentation for himself, the issue would be
decided by the assize. 3 1 However, if the plaintiff conceded that the defendant
or one of the defendant's ancestors made the last presentation, 'without any
recognition, the other party shall present one parson at least'.32 In other
words, a plaintiff who must concede that his opponent or his opponent's ances-
tor made the last presentation was not only barred from recovering under the
assize, he was also prevented from bringing the writ of right when the church
was vacant.33 The writ of right could be used to decide the right to present in
the future, but, if Glanvill correctly states the law of his day, 34 not to resolve an
immediate dispute over the presentation to a vacant church where the plaintiff
conceded the last presentation.
One who received an advowson by gift faced a further impediment to
bringing the writ of right. According to Glanvill, a plaintiff who brought a
writ of right had to state in court that he or one of his ancestors was seised
of the advowson in the time of Henry I, or since the time of Henry II's corona-
tion (1154). In order to sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must further assert
that he or his ancestor presented a parson at one of those times and that
parson was instituted by the bishop.35 A donee could not make such a
claim. As Bracton would later explain, a donor could give his right in an
advowson to a donee, 'but he cannot grant a hereditary action to anyone,
where he must of necessity claim by descent'. 36 Thus, the abbot or prior of
a religious house was required to state that he or his predecessor in office
made the last presentation. 37 It would not suffice to state that some layman
presented and subsequently gave the advowson to the monasteries.
38
Assuming these rules were enforced in the late twelfth century, prior to the
development of quare impedit, a party asserting a right to an advowson by gift
who could not claim the last presentation had few attractive options in the
royal court. For example, suppose that Geoffrey, a layman, presented a
parson named Warin to a particular church, and Warin was instituted parson
by the bishop. Either before or after the institution of Warin, Geoffrey exe-
cuted a charter in which he gave the advowson of that church in perpetuity
to a monastery. Now suppose that Geoffrey dies, leaving an heir, Ralph;
then Warin dies, and now the church is vacant. Ralph and the abbot both
present candidates to the bishop.
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At this point, Ralph has a choice. He could bring the assize of darrein pre-
sentment against the abbot, but if he does, the abbot will raise the exception
that he received the advowson by gift from Geoffrey, and Ralph will offer a
replication, claiming, for example, that Geoffrey presented Warin after the
gift was made, thus negating the gift.39 The question will be decided by a
jury. Ralph could also bring the writ of right and rely on his ancestor's
seisin, in which case the abbot could introduce his charter, offer a champion,
or put himself on the grand assize.40 Alternatively, Ralph could simply take no
action in the king's court and wait for the bishop to choose between the can-
didates as mandated by the Third Lateran Council, gambling that the bishop
will select Ralph's candidate.4 1
By contrast, the abbot can take no action in the king's court. He cannot
bring a successful action of darrein presentment because he must concede
that Ralph's ancestor presented the last parson. Moreover, if Glanvill correctly
states the law, the abbot cannot bring the writ of right, both because he must
concede the last presentation and because he cannot rely on the seisin of the
donor.
If he is optimistic by nature, the abbot could sue anyway, and hope that
Ralph will make some foolish mistake or the justices will not strictly apply
the rules stated in Glanvill. Examples can be found from the early thirteenth
century in which the justices, in fact, allowed a religious house to bring
darrein presentment or the writ of right based on a charter of gift;42 the
abbot might hope for leniency. But suppose the abbot is a pessimist: in
that case, he will wait for Ralph to make his move. If Ralph brings darrein
presentment, the abbot will rely on the gift and the jury will decide the
matter. If Ralph brings the writ of right, the abbot has multiple options. But
if Ralph chooses to wait, the outlook for the abbot in the king's court is
bleak.43 After the time limit set by the Third Lateran Council has elapsed,
the parson will automatically be chosen by the bishop, who may or may not
prefer the monastery's choice and who may be subject to influence by
Ralph in the interim. In either case, prior to quare impedit, Ralph has the
upper hand, because the rules of the king's court are stacked in his favour.
If Ralph's candidate becomes parson, he will be difficult to dislodge.
44
DATING THE WRIT OF QUARE IMPEDIT
The writ of quare impedit solved the predicament of the abbot in the above
example. This writ summoned the defendant to show 'why he impedes
(quare impedit)' the plaintiff from presenting a suitable parson to a particular
church, which the plaintiff says is vacant and of his donation.45 This writ gave
the donee a remedy while the church was still vacant - a condition explicitly
stated in the writ - thus enabling him to pre-empt his rival's presentation by
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commencing an action in the royal court. After the writ of quare impedit was
created, the limitations on darrein presentment and the writ of right stated in
Glanvill ceased to be of any real significance for donees.46
It is relatively easy to set a terminus ad quem for the writ of quare impedit.
The first three unambiguous references to quare impedit come from Hilary
Term, 1 196.4 Because these three entries involve mesne process, they are
clearly begun by writ rather than by plaint, although there is also an
example from the same term of what appears to be a quare impedit action
begun by plaint.48 Thus, we can say with confidence that the writ of quare
impedit was available by the beginning of 1196.
There are no clear examples of quare impedit in the plea rolls that survive
from 1194, and it would be tempting to conclude on that basis that the action
was created sometime in 1195. However, there are several examples in the
plea rolls of cases that are in some entries clearly marked as quare impedit,
but are referred to in other entries more vaguely as placitum ecclesie or pla-
citum advocacionis ecclesie 4 9 When the only entry that survives for a case
records an essoin or attornment, it is often impossible to tell whether the
case is quare impedit or a writ of right of advowson. Thus, the absence of
explicit references to quare impedit in the plea rolls of 1194 does not prove
that the writ had not yet been created. 50
One possibility, but an unlikely one, is that the writ of quare impedit pre-
dates both the Third Lateran Council and the assize of darrein presentment.
The sole piece of evidence suggesting this comes from Bracton. Discussing
the procedure to be followed when a defendant in a quare impedit action
fails to appear or essoin on the appointed day, Bracton contrasts the procedure
'at one time, before the Lateran council', with the procedure of his day.
Bracton asserts that, prior to the Council, 'when time did not run against pre-
sentors, impediants were attached by pledges and by better pledges, and the
whole solemn course of attachment was observed'. Quoting from the canon
law, however, Bracton explains that '[n]ow, however, for good reason and
of necessity, since what would otherwise not be lawful necessity makes so,
we must proceed more speedily because of the shortness of time', seizing
the person of the defendant or distraining him by lands and chattels.
51
Bracton's account could be read to mean that the writ of quare impedit
existed before the Third Lateran Council and that the pre-Council procedure
was changed following the Council to prevent the three months from
running. The procedure that Bracton describes as having been changed after
the Council, however, was actually standard in the early plea rolls. Defendants
were attached first by pledges and then, if the pledges failed to appear, by better
pledges. 52 The procedure may have eventually been changed to prevent the
three months from running during actions of quare impedit53 but whenever
the change was made, it was decades after the Third Lateran Council.
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It seems highly unlikely that quare impedit was created prior to the Third
Lateran Council or, indeed, prior to the assize of darrein presentment. The first
logical step in response to the Council was to create a swift action in the royal
courts for resolving disputes based on the last presentation; not until this
action was created would it have become evident that an equivalent action
was needed to protect the donee who acquired an advowson by enfeoffment.
Thus, quare impedit must have been created at some point between 1180 and
1196. The question is whether a more precise date can be set by reference to
Glanvill.
Maitland failed to find any reference in Glanvill to quare impedit,54 but Coke,
in his Second Institute, stated that 'the quare impedit is more ancient than the time
of E. I. as appeareth by Glanvile', citing Glanvill vi, 17, and xii, 20-21.55 The
second of these references is easy to dismiss; it sets forth the exception to
darrein presentment that may be made by a tenant who has received the
advowson by gift or other conveyance subsequent to the last presentation.
Coke probably confused the exception granted to the donee with the later
action of quare impedit. Coke's first citation, however, demands more attention. 56
In book vi, chapter 17, Glanvill discusses a widow's right of dower. After
distinguishing between nominated dower and dower with no specific nomina-
tion, Glanvill first states that, if no specific dower is nominated, the heir must
assign one-third of his ancestor's entire tenement to the woman, and if there is
only one church in the inheritance the heir cannot present without the widow's
consent.57 Glanvill does not state what the widow's remedy, if any, would have
been if the heir presented without her consent, but it may have been the writ of
right of dower, which orders the heir to do full right to the widow concerning
her dower.58 But Glanvill goes on to explain that, where the woman is given
specific land as nominated dower and there is a church in that fee, 'the
woman shall have the free presentation to it after the death of her husband
and can grant the church to any suitable clerk if it falls vacant'.5 9 In this
case the widow has the advowson for life, and it is reasonable to imply that
she would have had a remedy if someone impeded her presentation.
As discussed above, Glanvill states that a plaintiff who brings a writ of
right of advowson must rely on his own seisin or that of his ancestors. This
would seem to exclude both the donee and the widow. However, it is possible
that, when a widow claimed an advowson as part of her dower, she was
allowed to step into the shoes of her late husband and bring the writ of right
or the assize of darrein presentment. Indeed, a widow can be seen bringing
the writ of right in this way in a case of 1203,60 and the assize of darrein pre-
sentment was successfully used in a case of 1207,61 although one hesitates to
infer from either case what the practice might have been in Glanvill's day. 62
In any event, while Bracton would later state that the widow would have the
action of quare non permittit,63 a close cousin of quare impedit,64 it does not
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follow that this is the action that Glanvill had in mind for the widow in his dis-
cussion of dower. A different writ could have been used in the 1180s before
quare impedit provided the obvious remedy.
We must conclude that there is no clear reference to quare impedit
in Glanvill. The question, then, is whether Glanvill would have mentioned
the writ had it existed at the time the treatise was written. In his introduction,
the author of Glanvill makes clear that his aim is not to write down all the 'laws
and legal rules of the realm', which would be 'utterly impossible'. Rather,
Glanvill set out to commit to writing 'some general rules frequently observed
in court' which would be 'very useful for most people and highly necessary to
aid the memory'.65 We cannot necessarily assume, simply because the action
of quare impedit does not appear in Glanvill, that it was created after the
treatise was completed. Cases of quare impedit appear with some regularity
in the early plea rolls from 1196 on, but the writ was less common than
darrein presentment, not to mention the various actions relating to land.
One could therefore argue that Glanvill neglected to include quare impedit,
it being a somewhat unusual action at the time.
However, it is unlikely that the author of Glanvill would have neglected to
mention quare impedit had it existed at the time the treatise was written. The
action would have been relatively new and important, albeit infrequent. Given
the amount of space that Glanvill devotes to advowsons, it would have been
strange to omit any discussion of quare impedit had the writ been in existence.
Moreover, as discussed above, the treatise says that a plaintiff who brings a
writ of right will fail in his action if the church is vacant and the plaintiff con-
cedes that the defendant presented the last parson; in such a case, 'without any
recognition, the [defendant] shall present one parson at least' 66 This statement
is accurate only if there was no other action available to the plaintiff. Had the
writ of quare impedit existed at the time Glanvill was written, the treatise
author would have qualified his assertion by explaining that the plaintiff
thus prevented from bringing a writ of right had another remedy that did
not turn on who made the last presentation. Because Glanvill makes no
such qualification, the better reading of the text is that the action of quare
impedit did not yet exist.
Glanvill was probably completed at some point at the end of the reign of
Henry II, between 1187 and 1189.67 We can say, therefore, that the writ of
quare impedit was created towards the end of the twelfth century, most
likely after 1187 but definitely by the beginning of 1196.68
EARLY CASES OF QUARE IMPEDIT
Of the six cases from the reign of Richard I that can positively be identified
as quare impedit, four involve religious houses, and in three of the four the
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religious house is the plaintiff.69 The three earliest cases involving a religious
house, from Hilary term 1196, record only a failure to appear, and thus the
basis for the lawsuit cannot be divined from the evidence. However, based
on the fourth case, that between the abbot of Stanley and Matthew fitz
Herbert, discussed above, 70 and other similar cases from the reign of
John,7 1 we may suspect that the religious house was claiming the advowson
by gift as attested in a charter, and the dispute turned on the timing, validity,
or effect of the gift.72 Some of these cases may have resembled the hypothe-
tical dispute between Ralph and the abbot described above.
Given the involvement of religious houses in the early actions of quare
impedit, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the writ was created, at least
in part, in response to pressure from the monasteries. A religious house
usually traced its right in an advowson back to some gift by a layman, and
in many cases that layman, and not the religious house, had made the last pres-
entation. Religious houses frequently found themselves in this position, and
they probably used whatever influence they had at the royal court to create
a remedy that would cater to donees.
Because the religious houses usually based their claims on charter evi-
dence, Chancery might have been particularly receptive to their pleas in the
late twelfth century. In the centuries following the Norman Conquest,
written charters proliferated in England and parties began routinely to
record important transactions in writing. 73 At first, these parties were gener-
ally religious houses, but, with the spread of literacy, charters would
become increasingly common at all levels of society. 4 In this environment,
it may have seemed only fair to give parties whose claim was based on a
charter of gift an equal opportunity to sue for their right. However, one
swallow does not a summer make, and the creation of quare impedit by
itself does not prove that Chancery had adopted a broad policy of encouraging
written evidence. In any event, not all cases brought under quare impedit
involved charter evidence, and the subsequent history of the writ is more
complex.
It is clear that laymen used the writ of quare impedit from an early date. In
some cases, a layman had obtained an advowson by gift, in which case he
found himself in a similar position to the monasteries and chose to bring a
writ of quare impedit75 But other lay plaintiffs in the early cases of quare
impedit may have held by dower or curtesy; 76 at some point, quare impedit
would become the exclusive remedy for such plaintiffs, and it may
have been at least a preferred remedy for them from quite early on.77 A
widow could also bring quare impedit to claim an advowson as part of her
maritagium.78 Sometimes the writ of quare impedit could be used as an
alternative to the writ of right in order to circumvent the rule that rendered
the writ of right useless when the church was vacant, if indeed that rule was
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still enforced in the thirteenth century. 79 When a plaintiff conceded that the
defendant last presented, but claimed that the presentation was during the
plaintiff's wardship, quare impedit offered the appropriate remedy. 80 More-
over, by the second decade of the thirteenth century, plaintiffs brought
quare impedit when they claimed the advowson on behalf of a ward.81 In
short, over the course of the thirteenth century, quare impedit came to serve
useful purposes for plaintiffs both lay and religious, and charter evidence
was not always involved.
CONCLUSION
Although the monasteries played a key role in the development of quare
impedit, the remedy outlasted the monasteries by centuries and became the
principal writ for recovery of advowsons. After the early fourteenth century,
the use of the other advowson writs became rare, and quare impedit became
the dominant form of action. 82 By the time of Blackstone, quare impedit
was the sole action used by a plaintiff whose patronage of an advowson had
been disturbed.83 An early nineteenth century treatise on advowsons devotes
27 pages to the action of quare impedit8 4 Quare impedit was one of the few
real actions to survive the Real Property Limitation Act of 1833, which
abolished both the writ of right of advowson and the assize of darrein present-
ment.85 Not until 1860 was quare impedit finally abolished, when the real
actions were replaced by the writ of summons. 86 Like other actions in the
common law, the writ of quare impedit proved more useful and long-lasting
than its creators were likely to have imagined.
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